Introduction: Rumors of a Comeback vs. Reality

Recent media reports suggest that former President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan is being courted to contest for Nigeria’s presidency again. Allies within his party claim that Jonathan “stabilised the country and its economy within the six years of his administration” and insist his tenure was “under-appreciated” by Nigerians. Some even argue that not re-electing him in 2015 was a mistake, given the hardships Nigeria faces today. Jonathan’s gentle demeanor and soft-spoken style have helped craft an image of a compassionate leader, leading “many Nigerians to… plead with him to return and rescue the country,” according to his supporters.

However, a sober examination of Jonathan’s record in office (2010–2015) tells a starkly different story. Far from a savior, Jonathan’s presidency was arguably the worst in Nigeria’s history, marked by sheer incompetence in governance, wasteful spending during boom times, a gross failure to save for the future, and an obtuse inability to rein in corruption. Under his watch, billions of petrodollars were squandered with little to show in infrastructure or improvements in Nigerians’ lives. His administration’s lapses in security allowed terrorism (especially Boko Haram’s insurgency) to explode, costing countless lives. This essay exposes Jonathan’s legacy and argues that Nigerians should not be swayed by nostalgia or gentle smiles. The nation cannot afford a return to the era of clueless leadership, fiscal recklessness, and endemic graft that defined the Jonathan years. Instead, voters must demand competent administration, sound economic management, and accountability. In the following sections, we detail Jonathan’s failures across the oil sector and beyond, compare his record with those of President Olusegun Obasanjo before him and President Muhammadu Buhari after him, and offer recommendations to ensure Nigeria does not repeat its past mistakes.

Squandered Oil Boom: Windfall Wasted, No Savings for Rainy Days

Goodluck Jonathan had the extraordinary fortune of presiding over Nigeria during an oil bonanza. Oil prices were high and production robust, resulting in unprecedented revenues for the country. In fact, Nigeria earned about ₦51 trillion from petroleum during Jonathan’s five-year presidency (2010–2015) – a staggering sum that accounted for over half of all oil revenue generated by Nigeria since independence. By comparison, President Olusegun Obasanjo’s 1999–2007 administration (eight years) earned roughly ₦27 trillion, and Umaru Yar’Adua’s short tenure (2007–2010) about ₦9 trillion. Jonathan was “the luckiest of the leaders” in terms of revenue inflow. Yet, this luck did not translate into prosperity for Nigerians – instead, it was a tragically missed opportunity.

Despite the windfall, Jonathan’s government failed to save for the inevitable “rainy day.” During earlier boom years, Nigeria had established an Excess Crude Account (ECA) and later a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) precisely to squirrel away oil earnings for future needs. Under Jonathan, however, these mechanisms were mismanaged and effectively gutted. Even modest attempts at saving… suffered mismanagement and underhand spending by the Federal Government. The SWF became entangled in political tussles with governors, and the ECA – which had amassed billions under Obasanjo – was drained. Former President Obasanjo himself lamented that “almost $25 billion was kept in what they called excess crude… as reserve for the rainy days”, but “that reserve has been depleted!” by the end of Jonathan’s tenure. Obasanjo noted that when he left office in 2007, Nigeria’s foreign reserves (after clearing debt) stood at about $45 billion and climbed to $67 billion by late 2007, but by early 2015, reserves had plummeted to around $30 billion. He squarely blamed Jonathan’s administration, accusing it of “frivolous expenditure” and failure to save for the rainy day – a failure that “led Nigeria into the current economic mess” once oil prices fell. According to Obasanjo, Jonathan “squandered all” the healthy oil savings he inherited, including the $25–$35 billion in ECA funds and a foreign reserve of about $40–$60 billion. “Our inability to have a reserve has brought us into this economic quagmire,” Obasanjo warned in early 2015. His admonition proved prophetic: Nigeria slid into recession shortly after, when the oil market downturn hit a government left with an empty piggy bank.

Independent analyses confirm that Jonathan’s government utterly failed to instill a saving culture despite record oil income. The Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) reported that “different tiers of government… have indeed squandered the nation’s earnings” from oil, with consensus that huge revenues were simply spent or siphoned rather than invested. As one detailed report put it, “the typically Nigerian insincere approach to economic management” meant that both the ECA and the SWF “suffered” misuse. Instead of safeguarding surplus oil dollars, Jonathan’s administration yielded to pressure to splurge and distribute. (Jonathan later claimed he was “pressured” by powerful state governors to dip into the ECA, which stood at over $20 billion when he took office. But regardless of excuses, the fact remains that Nigeria entered the post-2014 oil price crash with almost no cushion.)

The consequences of this reckless fiscal management were dire. When global oil prices collapsed in late 2014, Nigeria was caught utterly unprepared. Government revenues cratered, the naira’s value plunged, and by the time Jonathan left office in May 2015, the economy was in crisis. Incoming President Muhammadu Buhari was so alarmed that he publicly lamented inheriting a “virtually empty treasury” with massive debts. Buhari called it “a disgrace that Nigeria is not able to pay workers’ salaries… this bad management that we find ourselves in”. Indeed, by mid-2015 Nigeria’s foreign reserves had fallen to about $28–30 billion (from over $40B a few years prior), and the Excess Crude Account was nearly drained (just ~$2 billion left). Buhari’s government had to weather a recession largely because Jonathan’s regime squandered the boom and saved nothing for the bust. In short, a combination of incompetence and short-sightedness under Jonathan wasted one of the biggest oil windfalls in Nigeria’s history. Had those funds been prudently managed – saved in stabilization funds, invested in infrastructure or diversifying the economy – Nigeria could have cushioned the 2015 oil shock and avoided much of the pain that followed. Instead, Nigerians got “nothing to show” for the boom but empty coffers and hard times.

Rampant Corruption and Wasteful Spending

A defining feature of the Jonathan era was endemic corruption and profligacy, particularly in the oil sector which is Nigeria’s economic lifeblood. While corruption long predates Jonathan, under his watch it reached unprecedented levels of impunity. Jonathan famously declared stealing to be somewhat distinct from corruption – a warped sentiment that seemed to translate into laissez-faire oversight as officials and cronies made away with billions. Nowhere was this more evident than in the management of Nigeria’s oil proceeds and subsidy programs.

One of the biggest scandals of Jonathan’s first years was the fuel subsidy fraud of 2009–2011, exposed by a parliamentary probe in 2012. The investigation uncovered a massive scam of about $6.8 billion involving inflated and falsified petroleum subsidy payments. According to the House report, the subsidy regime was “fraught with endemic corruption and entrenched inefficiency”.

Importers and officials colluded to claim subsidy payments for fuel that was never delivered, and to grossly overstate the volume Nigeria consumes. At the height of the scam, Nigeria was purportedly paying for 59 million liters of petrol daily while actual consumption was about 35 million liters. The overspending on subsidies in 2011 was 900% more than budgeted – ₦2.59 trillion spent versus ₦245 billion appropriated – an overrun equal to more than half the entire federal budget that year. In essence, billions were siphoned to bogus companies (some 140 “importers” by 2011, many of which existed only on paper) who collected subsidy money for ghost deliveries. The national oil company, NNPC, was complicit and “accountable to no one,” owing the treasury huge sums for its own blatant violations of the subsidy rules. Astonishingly, NNPC had accumulated a ₦704 billion ($4.3 billion) debt to the government for subsidy infractions, and also owed major fuel traders $3.5 billion – roughly the same amount that had been in the Excess Crude Account, “meaning that Nigeria essentially has no savings,” the report observed grimly.

Rather than decisively prosecute those responsible, Jonathan’s government dragged its feet – likely because many perpetrators were political allies in his power base. A Reuters analysis noted Jonathan was “unlikely to go after [them] if he wants to keep his power base intact”. Indeed, despite public outrage and calls for accountability (the “Occupy Nigeria” protests erupted in January 2012 when Jonathan’s attempt to remove fuel subsidies revealed the scale of theft), few big players were punished during his tenure. This laxity sent a clear message that graft had free rein. The president’s “see-no-evil” approach fostered a culture where ministers and officials could loot with impunity.

Jonathan’s Petroleum Minister, Diezani Alison-Madueke, became practically a personification of the corruption of that era. Appointed in 2010, Diezani oversaw NNPC and the oil industry, and multiple multi-billion-dollar scandals unfolded under her watch. Years later, investigators would unravel how she allegedly received vast bribes – luxury homes in London, private jet flights, shopping sprees at Harrods – in exchange for awarding lucrative oil contracts. She and her associates (oil dealers like Kola Aluko and Jide Omokore) were involved in opaque deals that diverted oil revenues into private hands. In one notorious scheme, shell companies were granted no-bid “strategic partnership” contracts to operate oil blocks – contracts that allowed them to reap profits tax-free while paying nothing in royalties. A former Central Bank governor, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, blew the whistle in late 2013 on the magnitude of the oil money leakage. Sanusi told Parliament that over an 19-month period, NNPC had sold $67 billion worth of oil, yet between $10 billion to $20 billion was unaccounted for – missing from the treasury. He described it plainly as “taking what doesn’t belong to you and transferring it to private hands,” warning that “the state is captive to vested interests”. Instead of applauding Sanusi’s patriotism, Jonathan’s response was to silence the messenger – Sanusi was suspended and effectively removed from his post in February 2014, in what was widely seen as retaliation for exposing high-level theft.

Though Jonathan’s administration tried to deny or downplay these revelations, the truth kept emerging. An officially commissioned audit by PwC (pressured by public outcry) later confirmed at least a $1.48 billion shortfall that NNPC had to remit, while questions lingered about much larger sums. In a subsequent court case abroad, the Nigerian government even explicitly accused Jonathan and Diezani of plotting to receive bribes and profit secretly from a massive oil block deal (the infamous OPL 245/Malabu transaction) – a stunning allegation against a former head of state. As a Council on Foreign Relations analysis noted, it’s “hard to believe Nigerian government lawyers would charge Jonathan… without clearance from the top,” underscoring the gravity of the evidence. In essence, even “on the street,” ordinary Nigerians long suspected Jonathan and his petroleum minister were implicated in monumental theft of oil revenues. The absence of formal charges during his presidency owed more to his tight grip on the levers of power than to innocence.

Corruption under Jonathan was not limited to the oil sector. Wasteful spending and graft permeated other areas of government as well. The period was replete with scandals: from multi-million dollar frauds in pension funds, to inflated contracts in arms procurement (as we’ll see later), to ostentatious waste in government operations. The presidency itself was not austere – the government spent lavishly on private jets, foreign travel, and even an infamous attempt to build a “Centenary City” vanity project. Meanwhile, basic public services languished. As one commentator caustically observed, Jonathan’s government often seemed “clueless” – either unaware or unconcerned about the plundering occurring under its nose. The perception of presidential weakness and complicity emboldened corrupt actors. Even state governors (across political parties) helped fritter away savings by constantly demanding distribution of oil revenues instead of investment – a practice Jonathan acquiesced to rather than resisted.

It is telling that by the end of Jonathan’s tenure, Nigeria ranked among the most corrupt countries globally, sitting near the bottom of Transparency International’s index. Years later, investigations have led to asset seizures and prosecutions of several key figures from his administration. Diezani Alison-Madueke, for example, was arrested in London in 2015 and, in 2023, was formally charged by UK prosecutors with bribery offenses related to her oil ministry tenure. Nigeria’s anti-graft agency (EFCC) has also been pursuing her and others, recovering some looted funds. These efforts underscore how genuine accountability only commenced after Jonathan left office, because under his leadership the political will to crack down was glaringly absent. In sum, Jonathan presided over a government of rampant graft and patronage, where billions that should have built Nigeria instead lined private pockets. Such wasteful spending – on phantom fuel subsidies, on inflated contracts, on outright theft – robbed Nigeria of the chance to invest in development when funds were plentiful. It is a legacy of infamy that should never be repeated.

Incompetent Economic Management and Infrastructure Decay

Beyond the lost oil wealth, Jonathan’s tenure was marked by weak governance and poor economic management across the board. It was not merely that money was stolen – even funds that were spent “legitimately” were often poured into consumption or frivolities rather than productive use. The administration’s fiscal policy could be described as shortsighted: heavy on populist spending and bailouts, light on strategic planning. Despite Nigeria’s robust GDP growth on paper (peaking when a GDP rebasing in 2014 made it Africa’s largest economy), the growth was largely jobless and non-inclusive, driven by high oil prices and the services sector while manufacturing stagnated. Poverty and unemployment remained stubbornly high. By 2015, Nigeria was spending over 70% of federal revenues on recurrent costs (salaries, overhead), leaving little for capital projects that directly benefit citizens. This imbalance worsened under Jonathan, as his government created new ministries and agencies, and expanded an already bloated bureaucracy. Wasteful expenditures – like billions on fuel subsidies benefiting a cartel of importers, or maintenance of presidential air fleets and excessive political appointees – crowded out investment in Nigeria’s future.

Crucially, virtually no major infrastructure renaissance took place despite the flush coffers in the early 2010s. Nigeria’s power sector offers a prime example. When Jonathan assumed office, Nigerians were enduring chronic electricity blackouts, with national generation hovering around 3,000–4,000 megawatts (MW) for a country of over 160 million people – woefully inadequate. In 2013, his government privatized power generation and distribution companies, promising that private sector efficiency would boost output. But the reform was poorly executed, saddled with allegations of favoritism in the sale of assets, and ultimately failed to deliver any immediate improvement in power supply. By the end of Jonathan’s tenure, electricity generation was still stuck around the same dismal range. In fact, in late April 2015, peak power output was about 4,500 MW, and then a combination of gas supply issues and mismanagement caused a collapse: by May 2015, generation plummeted to an “unprecedented low” of just 1,327 MW. This occurred one week before Jonathan handed over power, dramatically underscoring the sector’s dysfunction. The Ministry of Power itself admitted the situation was “an all-time… low” and raised alarms about the system’s fragility. Although some factors (like pipeline vandalism and a worker strike) contributed to that immediate crash, the broader point remains: after five years of Jonathan’s presidency and billions spent (including on 10 new National Integrated Power Project plants), Nigerians were still in the dark. Promises that output would reach 10,000 MW by 2015 never materialized – by September 2015, even after Jonathan’s exit, output briefly hit just ~4,800 MW, barely moving the needle past where it was years earlier. The power sector stagnation is a clear sign of Jonathan’s incompetence in executing critical reforms. As one frustrated headline noted at the time, “Nigeria’s power generation hits all-time low… power outages worsen”. For Nigerian businesses and households, these weren’t just statistics – it meant continued reliance on expensive diesel generators, higher costs, and lost economic potential. A competent administration would have used the oil boom to significantly expand the electricity grid (perhaps via new large-scale investments in generation, transmission, and gas infrastructure). Jonathan’s did not.

The story was similar in other infrastructure areas. Roads and transportation saw only halting progress. Important highway projects – the East-West Road in the Niger Delta (linking Warri to Akwa Ibom through Bayelsa, Jonathan’s home state), the Lagos-Ibadan Expressway, the Second Niger Bridge, among others – languished or moved at snail’s pace during his tenure. Even former Edo State Governor Adams Oshiomhole (from Jonathan’s Niger Delta region) observed that “even the road to Yenagoa [Bayelsa’s capital] didn’t show that a president came from that area”, meaning Jonathan failed to develop his own state’s basic infrastructure. “The south-south had nothing to boast of,” Oshiomhole quipped, noting that “even the most basic things were not properly done” under Jonathan. This critique resonates nationwide: outside a few token projects, there was scant evidence of the transformational infrastructure one would expect given the revenues available. Nigeria’s refineries remained moribund (fuel importation actually increased), railway modernization was minimal (aside from finishing a couple of track rehabilitation projects begun long before, like the Abuja-Kaduna rail which only became operational after Jonathan’s era). Overall, the nation’s highways, rail, airports, and public utilities continued to deteriorate or stagnate on his watch, leaving an infrastructure deficit that we still grapple with today.

In social sectors like education and healthcare, Jonathan’s government fared little better. Nigerian universities descended into crises during his tenure, with lecturers frequently on strike due to unmet government promises. Strikingly, university lecturers (ASUU) were on strike for a cumulative 13 months during Jonathan’s years in power (2010, 2011, 2013) over issues of funding and agreements reneged on by his administration. This means that for over a year, university students sat at home rather than in class, a damning indictment of the government’s handling of higher education. Each strike was eventually “settled” by rushed promises or payments (often drawing from emergency funds, since no provision had been saved for such commitments), but the underlying issues of inadequate university funding persisted. Even President Jonathan himself admitted in a moment of candor that “our children stay out of school for four good months” was unacceptable – yet it happened under his watch. Similarly, the health sector saw doctors and other workers strike multiple times between 2013 and 2015 over unpaid allowances and poor conditions. Hospitals lacked essential equipment and drugs despite budgetary allocations vanishing into corrupt contracts. No fundamental health reforms took place; Nigeria remained ill-prepared for health emergencies (with the fortunate exception of the localized Ebola response in 2014, which succeeded thanks to heroic health workers and state-level action, not federal foresight). All of this traces back to weak leadership and administrative ineptitude – Jonathan often seemed overwhelmed by the complexity of governance, reacting late or not at all to brewing problems until they hit crisis levels.

Perhaps the most succinct summary of Jonathan’s administrative performance came from Oshiomhole’s reflections after 2015. “Even the most basic things were not properly done. Competence that was expected was not there,” the former governor said bluntly. He recounted how federal agencies under Jonathan even botched something as routine as a recruitment exercise: in 2014, a nationwide recruitment drive by the immigration service turned tragic when over a dozen young applicants died in stampedes due to poor organization and alleged extortion of candidates. “That was the height of incompetence – that the federal government would defraud unemployed people, ask them to pay fees for a job, [only to mishandle the process],” Oshiomhole recalled with outrage. This tragic incident, broadcast on national media, encapsulated the administrative chaos and lack of accountability pervasive in Jonathan’s government.

In summary, Nigeria under Jonathan was a nation of squandered potential. Despite robust resources at hand, the basic indicators of development scarcely improved. Infrastructure remained in disrepair; electric power was scarce; universities and hospitals were frequently shuttered by strikes; job creation was anemic even as the population grew. The “transformation agenda” Jonathan touted ended up being more slogan than substance. His government’s failures set back Nigeria’s progress and directly contributed to the economic and infrastructural quagmire the country is in today. The current parlous state of our roads, the still-limited power supply, the fragile economy overly reliant on oil, and even the debt overhang (as later governments had to borrow to finance infrastructure that should have been paid for from past oil earnings) – all these have roots in the mismanagement of the Jonathan era. Nigerians must recognize that inept leadership has tangible costs: the hardships we face now did not emerge overnight but were years in the making, significantly exacerbated by the wasted years between 2010 and 2015.

Security Failures: Boko Haram and National Insecurity Under Jonathan

If there is one domain where government incompetence literally killed Nigerians during Jonathan’s presidency, it is security. Jonathan’s tenure saw the meteoric rise of Boko Haram, the Islamist terrorist group that turned the Northeast of Nigeria into a war zone. Boko Haram’s insurgency actually began around 2009, but it escalated dramatically from 2010 onward – right under Jonathan’s nose. Unfortunately, his government’s response oscillated between denial, dithering, and heavy-handed crackdowns that often proved counterproductive. The result was a security collapse in parts of the country and the entrenchment of terrorism that Nigeria is still battling today.

Jonathan, a southern Christian, initially appeared to underestimate the Boko Haram threat, sometimes suggesting (incorrectly) that it was a political plot by his northern opponents rather than a serious terror movement. By the early 2010s, Boko Haram was bombing churches, police stations, and UN offices in Abuja, yet coordination among Nigeria’s security agencies was poor. Corruption also crippled the military’s ability to fight – as we will detail shortly, money meant for weapons was looted, leaving soldiers ill-equipped. It wasn’t until 2013 that Jonathan declared a state of emergency in the three worst-hit states (Borno, Yobe, Adamawa) and launched a full-scale military offensive. Even then, gains were limited and often reversed. Boko Haram fighters overran military bases, and by 2014 they were seizing territory: horrifyingly, the group captured dozens of towns and declared a self-styled “caliphate” over an area the size of Belgium in northeastern Nigeria. Thousands of civilians were slaughtered or kidnapped, and hundreds of thousands displaced. This happened on Jonathan’s watch, a glaring testament to failure in the core duty of securing the nation.

The kidnapping of over 200 schoolgirls from Chibok in April 2014 became the symbol of Jonathan’s ineptitude in security matters. The world remembers the #BringBackOurGirls campaign – a global outcry that arose only after the Nigerian government’s sluggish response to the abduction. Jonathan’s administration waited weeks before even addressing the mass kidnapping, and initially downplayed or denied it, losing critical time that could have been used to hunt the kidnappers. Sky News reported that “Mr Jonathan and his government have been widely criticised for their slow response to the kidnapping on April 14”, noting that it took an international outcry and street protests to spur the Nigerian authorities into action. By the time Jonathan finally visited the town of Chibok (a symbolic gesture he delayed for over three weeks) and sought outside help, the trail to rescue the girls had largely gone cold. A U.S. Senate committee chairman bluntly stated that Nigeria had been “tragically and unacceptably slow” in tackling the crisis, calling on President Jonathan “to demonstrate the leadership his nation is demanding”. Those were damning words coming from abroad, reflecting how Nigeria’s government was seen as paralyzed and clueless in the face of brazen terrorism.

Even beyond Chibok, Jonathan’s management of the military campaign was poor. Reports from that period show that Nigeria’s security forces were often outgunned and demoralized, complaining of lack of weapons and even basics like food. By late 2014, Boko Haram was openly defeating Nigerian units in battle. The African Union had to assemble a multinational force with neighboring countries (Chad, Niger, Cameroon) to start pushing back the insurgents. Morale in the Nigerian Army sank as soldiers felt the government was not supporting them; there were instances of troops refusing orders or even mutinying due to dire conditions. International partners found Jonathan’s security apparatus frustrating to work with – U.S. officials described Nigeria under him as “an extremely challenging partner” in counterterrorism, citing an unwillingness to reform or accept assistance. The lack of political will and coordination was palpable.

One horrifying reason for the Army’s weakness emerged after Jonathan left office: the so-called “Dasukigate” arms procurement scandal. In late 2015, the new Buhari administration revealed that over $2 billion meant for purchasing weapons to fight Boko Haram had been embezzled under Jonathan. Sambo Dasuki, Jonathan’s National Security Adviser, was accused of awarding “phantom contracts” for helicopters, jets, and ammunition that were never delivered – essentially, money budgeted for military hardware was paid out to front companies and disappeared. The scale of this fraud was mind-numbing. Presidential spokesman Femi Adesina stated that “thousands of needless Nigerian deaths would have been avoided if the money had been properly spent” on actual armaments. In other words, the corruption at the heart of Jonathan’s security spending directly cost lives, because it left troops underequipped against a brutal insurgency. Al Jazeera reported on Buhari’s announcement ordering Dasuki’s arrest, where the government outlined how Dasuki moved $142.6 million to unknown accounts and flouted procurement rules. Some of the funds even ended up tangled in political campaigns – basically diverted to serve partisan ends while soldiers were “forced to train in slippers” due to lack of gear. It is hard to imagine a greater dereliction of duty by a government. Jonathan either was unaware of this massive graft under his nose (which speaks to incompetence) or he turned a blind eye (which speaks to complicity). Either way, the outcome was a weak military response to Boko Haram, allowing the terrorists to terrorize Nigerians unabated for years.

By the time Jonathan left office in May 2015, Boko Haram had killed over 15,000 Nigerians (by some estimates) and displaced over 2 million. The Northeast’s towns were devastated. It was only after a change in administration that the tide really turned militarily – within the first year of Buhari’s term, Boko Haram was largely driven out of the towns and pushed into hiding in the Sambisa forest. That swift reversal begs the question: what exactly was missing during Jonathan’s years? The answer: leadership and accountability. Jonathan often appeared clueless about security strategy – he once even claimed that Boko Haram had infiltrated his own government, yet he did not purge or reform the intelligence services accordingly. Governors in the affected states complained about slow or no response from the federal authorities when attacks happened. The infamous case of the Buni Yadi school massacre in 2014 (dozens of boys murdered by Boko Haram in a dormitory) met with near silence from the presidency for far too long. These failures not only created but also confirmed an impression of a president in over his head, unable to grasp the urgency of the threat or to marshal his team effectively. By contrast, Nigerians saw in 2015 a retired general (Buhari) who campaigned on taking decisive action against Boko Haram – a key reason Jonathan was rejected at the polls.

It is important to also note that other security issues festered under Jonathan: armed robbery and kidnapping for ransom became more rampant in the South, oil theft in the Niger Delta reached industrial scale (Nigeria was losing an astonishing 100,000+ barrels of oil per day to thieves at one point), and ethnic/religious clashes periodically erupted without coherent federal responses. While no president can prevent all crime, Jonathan’s tenure gave a sense of drift – a reactive approach rather than proactive strategy. The overall security architecture suffered from corruption and politicization, as exemplified by the Boko Haram fiasco.

In conclusion, Jonathan’s track record on security stands as one of gross incompetence with deadly consequences. Nigerians, especially in the Northeast, paid for that incompetence in blood and tears. The menace of Boko Haram today – though reduced – is part of Jonathan’s legacy. He allowed the cancer to grow when early decisive action might have contained it. A return of Jonathan to power raises the nightmare prospect of similarly feckless responses to Nigeria’s security challenges, whether it be terrorism, banditry, or separatist unrest. Nigerians cannot afford leadership that is “slow” and “unacceptably” indifferent in the face of threats to citizens’ lives. Protecting lives and property is the foremost duty of any government, and on that count the Jonathan administration was an unequivocal failure.

Comparative Perspectives: Jonathan vs. Obasanjo and Buhari

To truly label Jonathan Nigeria’s “worst president,” one should weigh his performance against those of other leaders. While every Nigerian administration has its flaws, Jonathan’s stands out negatively when compared to his immediate predecessor (Obasanjo, if we consider economic stewardship) and successor (Buhari, in terms of confronting the aftermath).

Under President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007), Nigeria certainly had corruption and problems, but Obasanjo’s team implemented some significant reforms and left the nation better prepared in certain areas. Obasanjo, working with technocrats like Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, secured debt relief in 2005, wiping out $30 billion of external debt and freeing future budgets. He also built up substantial reserves. As noted earlier, Obasanjo left behind some $45 billion in reserves and $25+ billion in the ECA. He created institutions such as the EFCC (anti-corruption commission) and started the Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI) to address oil sector opacity. He also presided over the liberalization of the telecom sector, which led to the GSM telephone revolution and an entrepreneurial boom. Infrastructure investment during Obasanjo’s era was not stellar, but some projects (like power plant contracts and highway improvements) were initiated – unfortunately many were incomplete by the time he left. That said, Obasanjo’s government, for all its shortcomings, did not have the sheer scale of squander and inertia that Jonathan’s did during a period of even greater opportunity. Obasanjo himself was so appalled by Jonathan’s profligacy that he openly castigated him, as we cited, for bringing the economy to a mess by failing to save and tolerating corruption. It is telling that Obasanjo – no saint himself – viewed Jonathan’s administration as perhaps the worst since Nigeria’s return to democracy.

Comparing Jonathan to President Muhammadu Buhari (2015–2023) is complicated by the fact that Buhari’s tenure had its own significant challenges and controversies. Buhari took office as oil prices were at a low ebb and had to navigate the economy through a recession. His government faced criticism for certain economic policies (like a initially slow monetary response, and later high inflation). However, in key areas like anti-corruption and infrastructure, Buhari’s record arguably shows more effort and seriousness than Jonathan’s. Buhari’s administration, for instance, implemented a Treasury Single Account (TSA) to curb public finance leakages, enforced bank verification numbers (BVN) to crack down on fraud, and pushed through some long-delayed infrastructure projects. In Buhari’s years, Nigeria finally completed the Abuja–Kaduna railway, launched the Lagos–Ibadan standard gauge railway, finished the Second Niger Bridge, and invested in numerous road projects nationwide. Many of these projects were funded by loans (since, thanks to Jonathan’s empty treasury, the government had to borrow), but at least assets were being created rather than money disappearing with nothing to show. The Excess Crude Account, albeit mismanaged further, was an anemic $2 billion in 2015 – practically empty – giving Buhari little to fall back on. Despite this, by 2020, foreign reserves had been shored up somewhat (thanks also to an uptick in oil around 2017 and prudent central bank actions). On security, Buhari’s government decisively degraded Boko Haram within the first two years, reclaiming all territory (though insurgency persists as asymmetric warfare). Buhari also confronted a new wave of banditry and kidnappings with mixed success, but he certainly did not ignore or deny the problems’ existence the way Jonathan seemed to at times. In summary, Buhari inherited a very difficult hand largely due to Jonathan’s failures – a collapsed oil revenue environment, an empty treasury, a raging insurgency, and deeply entrenched corruption networks. While Buhari’s results are debatable on some fronts, it’s clear that Jonathan left Nigeria far worse off in 2015 than he met it in 2010. Conversely, Obasanjo left Nigeria in 2007 better than he met it in 1999 (economically and institutionally), and Buhari arguably left in 2023 having at least built some infrastructure and kept the country intact through tough times. That sandwiching of Jonathan by two very different leaders only accentuates how Jonathan’s term was an outlier in underperformance given the resources at his disposal.

An illustration often cited: Obasanjo’s government, in its last few years, maintained growth and even a fiscal surplus by saving oil money; Buhari’s government had to implement austerity and borrowing to survive low oil prices; Jonathan’s government, despite high oil prices, ran the treasury dry. This is a reversal of what logic would dictate – ideally boom times (Jonathan’s era) should save for the bust (Buhari’s early era). Because that did not happen, Nigerians experienced unnecessary hardship that cannot be pinned on global forces alone but on leadership failure.

All these comparisons drive home the point: in the pantheon of Nigerian presidents, Goodluck Jonathan ranks at or near the bottom in performance. His defenders may point out that he conducted a free election and conceded defeat peacefully in 2015 – a laudable act for democracy, yes – but a single gracious concession cannot erase five years of maladministration. The gentle persona that Jonathan projected belied a hollow core of leadership. Other presidents had their faults: Obasanjo could be authoritarian and self-serving at times, Umaru Yar’Adua (2007–2010) had a short, unfulfilled tenure marred by illness, Buhari had an austere style that some say stifled the economy. But Jonathan’s unique combination of economic mismanagement, absence of strategic vision, tolerance of graft, and weak security leadership arguably did the most damage relative to what was possible. It is for this constellation of reasons that many Nigerians in hindsight refer to his presidency as an era of waste and lost opportunity.

Policy Recommendations: Charting a Better Course for Nigeria

As Nigeria looks ahead, the lessons from Jonathan’s disastrous tenure should inform what kind of leaders and policies we choose. It is not enough to reject Jonathan’s candidacy; Nigerians must also insist on policy changes so that no future administration (whether led by Jonathan or anyone else) can repeat the same mistakes. Here are key policy recommendations and principles to embrace, distilled from the hard-earned lessons of 2010–2015:

Institutionalize a Saving Culture: Nigeria must legally mandate savings of oil revenues during boom periods. The Excess Crude Account and Sovereign Wealth Fund mechanisms should be strengthened by law, with transparent rules that limit withdrawals and ensure funds are invested prudently. Had such laws and political will been in place, Jonathan’s penchant for emptying the ECA would have been checked. Going forward, any leader must operate within a framework that forces discipline, saving a significant percentage of export earnings for stabilization and future generations. This will cushion the economy against oil price volatility and prevent the kind of economic shock and currency collapse Nigeria suffered due to Jonathan’s lack of foresight.

Zero Tolerance for Corruption: Nigeria’s fight against corruption cannot be lip service. The next administration should implement robust anti-graft measures, including empowering agencies like EFCC and ICPC to act without political interference, protecting whistleblowers (instead of firing them as Jonathan did to Sanusi), and digitizing government finances to reduce leakages (expanding on initiatives like TSA). High-profile prosecutions must occur regardless of political party – no more “sacred cows.” During Jonathan’s era, too many allies were untouchable; breaking that norm is crucial. Additionally, reforms such as open contracting and transparent subsidy regimes can prevent scams like the $6.8bn fuel subsidy fraud. For example, subsidy payments should be audited in real-time and the process opened to public scrutiny to avoid phantom transactions (like the absurd 128 payments of ₦999 million each made in 24 hours in 2009 as noted in the House probe). Strong oversight and public transparency will deter the scale of graft seen under Jonathan.

Diversify and Invest in Real Sectors: Relying on oil was Nigeria’s bane under Jonathan – when oil faltered, the economy crumbled because little had been done to build other sectors despite the oil boom. Policy going forward must prioritize economic diversification: investing oil revenues into agriculture, manufacturing, solid minerals, and technology. For instance, reviving agriculture (as Obasanjo and even Jonathan’s own Agriculture Minister started to do) can create millions of jobs and reduce dependence on food imports. Value addition industries (like petrochemicals, refining, metals) should be seeded so that Nigeria isn’t just exporting crude and importing refined products at a premium. If Jonathan had kick-started a major diversification drive when Nigeria had ample funds, perhaps the country wouldn’t have been so vulnerable. Future leaders must learn from that and push for structural changes in the economy – with policies that support small and medium enterprises, improve ease of doing business, and encourage foreign investment outside the oil sector.

Infrastructure First: tangible development over politics: One of Jonathan’s gravest errors was failing to convert revenue into infrastructure. Nigeria’s next governments should adopt an “infrastructure first” mentality – every budget cycle, prioritize funding for power, roads, rails, and social infrastructure before non-essential spending. Key projects like nationwide highway upgrades, railway networks linking major cities, expanded power generation and distribution (targeting 24/7 electricity), and investments in education and healthcare facilities must take precedence. To fund these, Nigeria can leverage public-private partnerships and targeted borrowing – but critically, ensure projects are completed on schedule and on budget. This may require strengthening project monitoring agencies and eliminating contract fraud (which was rife in Jonathan’s time, leading to many uncompleted projects). The payoff is huge: good infrastructure lowers the cost of doing business, spurs growth, and tangibly improves citizens’ quality of life. We’ve seen glimpses of this with some recently completed projects (e.g., new rail lines); we need to accelerate that momentum, not return to stagnation.

Strengthen Security Sector Accountability: Never again should Nigeria allow the kind of security sector rot that happened under Jonathan, where funds for weapons were embezzled and terrorists were left to thrive. Reforms are needed to professionalize the military and police, enforce procurement transparency for defense contracts, and improve civilian oversight of the security budget. A dedicated audit unit for defense spending could be established reporting to the National Assembly, to prevent another “Dasukigate.” Training and equipping of forces should be treated with utmost seriousness – our soldiers should never have to mutiny or abandon posts due to lack of arms while their commanders divert money. Moreover, intelligence agencies must be modernized and coordinated to detect and pre-empt threats like Boko Haram early. A leadership that leads from the front – visiting troops, boosting morale, and crafting clear counter-insurgency strategies – is essential. Nigerians expect and deserve safety; it must be a top policy priority, not an afterthought. The success of any economic or social policy hinges on a secure environment.

Empower and Consult Technocrats: Jonathan’s regime had competent technocrats (like the finance minister Okonjo-Iweala) but often politics overruled sound advice. Future administrations should empower professionals to make evidence-based decisions. For example, if economic advisors warn that spending is unsustainable, the president must have the discipline to cut wasteful expenses (rather than continue until the treasury is “virtually empty”). Key appointments in finance, oil, security, etc., should be based on merit and track record, not patronage. A president who listens to expert counsel and is willing to take tough decisions (like trimming a subsidy that’s hemorrhaging funds but doing so in a structured, transparent way with clear palliatives, unlike Jonathan’s abrupt removal that triggered backlash) will steer Nigeria better. Inclusive governance – consulting stakeholders, civil society, opposition, and learning from past mistakes – will also help avoid the aloof, insular decision-making that plagued Jonathan’s administration.

These recommendations, among others, form a blueprint for responsible governance. The overarching theme is accountability and foresight: qualities that Jonathan sorely lacked, but which Nigeria must demand in the future. If we implement such policies, the nation can steadily correct course, build resilience against shocks, and ensure that never again will a fortune be so wasted nor our security so neglected.

Conclusion: Reject the Past, Embrace a Better Future

Goodluck Jonathan’s tenure as president is a cautionary tale of squandered riches and rudderless leadership. His gentle and affable demeanor masked a profound ineptitude in governance that left Nigeria economically wounded, infrastructure-poor, and besieged by terrorists. Nigerians must not allow themselves to be deceived again by a smiling face or nostalgic rhetoric. The facts speak loudly: under Jonathan, Nigeria earned unprecedented oil revenues but ended up with virtually nothing in the treasury; corruption became institutionalized to the point that billions meant for development and security vanished; vital sectors from power to education stagnated or deteriorated; and Boko Haram turned large swathes of our country into killing fields on his watch. This is not a record to be rewarded with another chance at Aso Rock – it is one that should be met with firm electoral rejection and remembered as a lesson in what kind of leadership to avoid.

To my fellow Nigerians: elections are not popularity contests or exercises in nostalgia. They are about our collective future. We cannot move forward by returning to the failures of the past. However polished the rebranding of Jonathan’s legacy might be by those urging his comeback, we owe it to ourselves to remain clear-eyed. A former president who presided over “the height of incompetence” in so many areas, who admitted “I tried my best” even as children were out of school and funds looted, is not the visionary Nigeria needs now. Our nation faces serious challenges – economic recovery, infrastructure building, quelling multiple security threats, and lifting millions from poverty. These tasks require dynamic, decisive, and disciplined leadership anchored in integrity and competence.

Rather than recycle a leader who has already proven incapable and clueless in administration, Nigerians should seek out candidates with a track record of prudent governance, courage to fight corruption, and tangible developmental achievements. We need leaders who will save for the future, not splurge everything; who will build, not squander; who will unite and secure the country, not allow it to drift into chaos. Jonathan’s gentle persona cannot erase the corruption under his nose, just as a kindly smile cannot light our homes or defeat terrorists. As the proverb goes, “A gentle man cannot shave a lion.” In the fierce arena of governance, we require more than affability – we require ability.

In closing, this is a plea to Nigerians’ sense of memory and responsibility: Do not be swayed by short-term sentiments or forget the cost of poor leadership. The current economic hardships, infrastructural gaps, and security struggles Nigeria endures have roots in yesterday’s choices. Let us not repeat those mistakes tomorrow. No amount of rebranding can change the incontrovertible truth that Goodluck Jonathan’s presidency was a failure for Nigeria. The most patriotic step he can take is to enjoy his retirement and allow new, capable hands to take the nation forward. And the most patriotic step Nigerians can take is to reject any attempt to return to that era of waste and graft. We must instead channel our votes and voices toward a future defined by accountability, progress, and hope – a future where Nigeria’s wealth is used to lift Nigerians up, not frittered away, and where leadership is synonymous with service and competence, not cluelessness. The power to ensure that lies in our hands at the ballot box. Let us wield it wisely, for the sake of our children and generations to come.

Sources:

Vanguard News – “2027: Jonathan ready to run again, close ally confirms”

Vanguard News – “Jonathan squandered $55bn oil money — OBJ”

Vanguard News – “Under Jonathan, Nigeria earned N51 trillion from crude oil”

Reuters Special Report – “Anatomy of Nigeria’s $20 billion ‘leak’”

Reuters (Factbox) – “Nigeria’s $6.8 billion fuel subsidy scam”

CFR (John Campbell) – “Nigerian Government Accuses Jonathan of Accepting Bribes”

Sky News – “Nigeria President Criticised for Slow Response to Chibok Kidnapping”

Al Jazeera – “$2bn arms deal: Jonathan’s NSA accused of phantom contracts”

Vanguard News – “Nigeria’s treasury ‘virtually empty’, says Buhari”

YNaija – “Jonathan was incompetent to lead Nigeria – Oshiomhole”

The ICIR – “ASUU strikes lasted 13 months under Jonathan”