I have followed the Boko Haram (BH) insurgency with close attention and scholarly commitment since 2006. Over the years, I have gathered not only data but deep insight into the group’s formation, evolution, and current state. While many continue to view BH solely as a violent terrorist group, we must remember that its origins and trajectory are far more complex than often acknowledged.

Boko Haram did not start out as a terrorist organization. In its early years, it functioned much like a parallel government. The group set up cooperative systems to empower its members, distributing motorcycles and grinding machines to support livelihoods. These initiatives were not funded by foreign interests, but by local contributions and community-based support. The original founder, Abubakar Lawan, handed leadership over to Muhammad Yusuf when he left Nigeria to pursue a Master’s degree in Computer Science in Saudi Arabia.

Under Yusuf’s leadership, the group attracted many followers, including professionals and people from respected backgrounds. It was a time when the group was more of a socio-religious movement, focused on welfare, self-reliance, and a critique of Western influence in Nigerian governance and education. However, the political class and their religious allies soon turned against Yusuf, accusing him of heretical teachings. He was invited to Saudi Arabia, where he was challenged over his doctrines. Upon returning to Nigeria, he was arrested. Though powerful sympathizers secured his release, the government’s poor handling of the aftermath and Yusuf’s subsequent extrajudicial killing ignited a violent transformation. From that point, the group turned militant—and Nigeria lost a crucial window for constructive engagement.

Much of the early funding came from within Nigeria. Ordinary citizens, in fulfilling religious obligations like zakat, unknowingly financed a movement they believed to be spiritually and socially motivated. While there was some foreign support during Yusuf’s lifetime, this diminished significantly after his death.

Today, Boko Haram survives largely on local criminal economies. Robbery, cattle rustling, and the collection of informal taxes from fish and pepper traders around the Lake Chad Basin now fuel its operations. Kidnapping for ransom has also become a major source of income. During a field visit to Kaiama a few years ago, my team discovered burnt CFA franc notes—clear evidence of financial transactions originating outside Nigeria, though not necessarily from foreign sponsors.

More recently, investigations have found little to no evidence of consistent foreign funding. A 2024 report on arms recovered from arrested Boko Haram members revealed that many of these weapons had been looted from state armories across the Chad Basin. This signals a shift from external supply chains to internal theft and black-market circulation.

Given these findings, I believe the time is ripe for dialogue. Boko Haram’s influence has declined significantly in the region. Engaging now, rather than relying solely on military operations, could lead to more sustainable outcomes. Military action alone cannot defeat terrorism. We need to understand its roots, appeal, and structure before we can hope to dismantle it effectively.

One of Nigeria’s greatest shortcomings in the fight against terrorism is the lack of intellectual and policy depth. Most of our leaders and policymakers approach terrorism purely from a law enforcement angle. This limited perspective has stifled innovation in both strategy and engagement. We need a broader, knowledge-driven response—one informed by local realities and historical context.

Since 2013, I have dedicated myself to researching terrorism, both globally and within Africa. I recently completed two manuscripts: Global Terrorism, which is currently under consideration by Cognella Publishing in the United States for classroom use, and Terrorism in Africa, which integrates African perspectives into the global discourse on terrorism and counterterrorism. These works are the result of five years of fieldwork, interviews, and deep analysis.

Terrorism is not just a security problem; it is also a social, political, and economic one. If we fail to recognize this, we will keep applying the wrong tools to a deeply rooted problem.

Nigeria must now embrace a more nuanced approach—one that values dialogue, justice, and knowledge as much as it does security operations. Only then can we hope to chart a path toward lasting peace.